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ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN 
ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATIONS: 
THE ROLE OF MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE REFORM 
LAURA D. HERMER∗ 
Health care cost, quality, and access are perennial “push you, pull me” 
problems in the United States.  Addressing any one or two of the three all too often 
negatively impacts the other.1 The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) in 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) offers a different twist on 
this paradigm.2  The MSSP encourages physicians and other health care providers 
to work together to lower health care costs while simultaneously improving health 
care quality and patient outcomes.3  If providers can cut back on care that is truly 
unnecessary or duplicative, substitute less-costly tests and therapies for ones that 
are more expensive yet equally effective, and improve (or at least not worsen) 
patient care in the process, then the providers may receive a share of savings that 
result.4  
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 1. See Mark V. Pauly, The Trade-Off Among Quality, Quantity, And Cost: How To Make 
It—If We Must, 30 HEALTH AFF. 574, 576 (2011) (discussing how improving the quality of care 
has resulted in higher costs and limited access to high-quality care).  Occasionally other measures 
are discussed in this context.  For example, “access” can substitute for “population health.”  See, 
e.g., Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH AFF. 759, 
760 (2008) (stating that “[t]he components of the Triple Aim are not independent of each other. 
Changes pursuing any one goal can affect the other two, sometimes negatively and sometimes 
positively.  For example, improving care for individuals can raise costs if the improvements are 
associated with new, effective, but costly technologies or drugs.  Conversely, eliminating overuse 
or misuse of therapies or diagnostic tests can lead to both reduced costs and improved 
outcomes.”). 
 2. See infra section II.B.1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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Many physicians and other providers moved quickly after the ACA was 
enacted to enter into arrangements that would allow them to take advantage of the 
MSSP and similar programs sponsored by private insurers that likely would—and 
did—arrive on the MSSP’s heels.5  Within a year and a half of the ACA’s 
enactment, 164 new Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) had been formed.6  
As of April 2014, that number had grown to 522.7  While ACOs are not new, the 
MSSP and related programs have unquestionably provided the impetus to their 
increase.  
Yet despite the initial enthusiasm, it is by no means clear that ACOs will 
succeed, whether individually or in the greater goal of changing our health care 
delivery system.  To be successful, ACOs will require a substantial amount of 
coordination and participant buy-in to a particular practice ethos.8  How does one 
convince skeptical and independent-minded physicians to follow guidelines and 
metrics set forth by ACOs—guidelines and metrics that are devised in part to 
reduce the volume of certain types of services provided, and hence also potentially 
lowering physicians’ financial returns?  How does one do this, in particular, when 
physicians not only may be making less money as a result of following these 
guidelines and metrics, but will also retain full liability for negligent outcomes?  
The ACA provides ACOs little support in this last respect.  It contains a 
provision giving malpractice coverage under the Public Health Service Act to 
physicians who volunteer their services at free clinics.9  It also authorized up to ten 
state demonstration projects to test different means of handling malpractice claims, 
although Congress later failed to provide the necessary funding for them.10  Apart 
from those provisions, the ACA contains nothing more concerning medical 
malpractice reform.  Traditional tort reform simply found no place in the ACA. 
 
 5. See David Muhlestein, Continued Growth of Public and Private Accountable Care 
Organizations, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 19, 2013, 12:47 PM), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/02/19/continued-growth-of-public-and-private-accountable-
care-organizations. 
 6. See, e.g., DAVID MUHLESTEIN ET AL., LEAVITT PARTNERS, GROWTH AND DISPERSION OF 
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2011), available at http://leavittpartners.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/ACO-Whitepaper.pdf  
 7. See Molly Gamble, Total Number of ACOs Tops 520, Becker’s Hospital Review (Apr. 
24, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/accountable-care-organizations/total-number-
of-acos-tops-520.html. . 
 8. See infra notes 107–115 and associated text. 
 9. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233(o)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 
2012) (making it so that “an officer, governing board member, employee, or contractor of a free 
clinic shall[,] in providing services for the free clinic[,]” be classified as an employee of the Public 
Health Service); see also id. § 233(o)(6)(A) (allotting $10,000,000 each year for judgments related 
to acts or omissions of free clinic health professionals). 
 10. See id. § 280g-15 (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to award 
demonstration grants to States for the purpose of medical malpractice tort reform); Phil Galewitz, 
Some Programs Ok'd By Health Law Lacking Funding, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 9, 2011), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/june/09/unfunded-appropriations-health-law.aspx.  
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If ACOs are to succeed more broadly, it may be important for state 
legislatures to address medical malpractice to reflect the changes currently 
underway in our health care system.11  The question is how to do this while also 
facilitating better integration of care delivery and, ideally, sufficiently improving 
the practice of medicine such that a critical mass of physicians will support and 
participate in the proposed changes.  The answer may best be given by an idea last 
entertained during the heyday of managed care: enterprise liability.12  As the name 
suggests, enterprise liability would make a health care entity, such as a hospital or 
an ACO, financially liable for acts of negligence, rather than or possibly in addition 
to the individual providers staffing it or otherwise providing services under its 
auspices.13  Given the consolidation in the health care market,14 the increasing 
movement toward employment of physicians by hospitals, health insurers, and 
other entities,15 the incentives that the ACA gives for various forms of integrated 
care that meet or exceed quality benchmarks,16 and the persistence of the problems 
of our traditional means of addressing medical malpractice,17 the time is ripe to 
revisit enterprise liability as a means of rationally revamping our medical liability 
system. 
Toward this end, the first section of this article examines the aspirational and 
actual ends we respectively seek and achieve under our current liability system, and 
also considers whether additional goals and different means might be more 
desirable.  The second section focuses on the ACA’s direct and indirect means of 
affecting medical malpractice, paying particular attention to the intersection of 
liability concerns with proposed changes in health care delivery.  The third section 
considers a variety of possible reforms to our medical malpractice system, showing 
how enterprise liability can solve the problem of the pressures that the ACA will 
likely put on our already-beleaguered health care liability regime by reorienting 
that regime to a systems-based approach. Enterprise liability has the potential to 
substantially remove liability pressures from physicians, encourage teamwork 
among health care practitioners, urge creation of systemic solutions to health care 
quality problems, and more appropriately compensate patients who are injured as a 
 
 11. The question of whether malpractice ought to be taken up by the federal government 
rather than continuing to be addressed on a state-by-state basis will not be addressed here.  See 
Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in Medical 
Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 846–48 (2009), for one treatment of this issue. 
 12. See William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care 
System, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 159 (1997). 
 13. Id. at 159. 
 14. Health care market consolidation has increased more than 50% since 2009, according to 
PwC, and is expected to continue into 2014.  Factors Affecting 2014 Medical Cost Trend, 
PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industries/behind-
the-numbers/index.jhtml (last visited May 29, 2014). 
 15. See infra note 166.  
 16. See infra notes 97–100 and associated text. 
 17. See infra notes 23–37 and associated text.  
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result of negligence.  It remains to be seen, however, whether physicians would be 
prepared to accept the impact these changes may have on professional autonomy 
and ethical standards in the provision of care, and whether they would have 
sufficient power to prevent them if they wish to oppose them. 
I.  THE GOALS AND OUTCOMES OF OUR                                                                           
PRESENT MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 
Without getting into a lengthy discussion of tort jurisprudence, tort law is 
generally thought to have either a deterrent or compensatory effect, if not both.18  
Medical liability law, as a species of tort law, arguably shares both these goals.19  It 
is supposed to provide an incentive for physicians, hospitals, and other health care 
providers to render careful and high quality care, or at the very least to avoid 
harming patients.20  Patients who are injured due to negligence allegedly can obtain 
redress for the damages they suffer.21  Medical liability law additionally allegedly 
promotes economic efficiencies by optimizing distribution of the costs of accidents, 
such that the “winners” in the system gain more than the “losers” lose.22  
Yet there is little, if any, evidence that our present system substantially deters 
errors or reasonably compensates most victims of malpractice, and there is much 
 
 18. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 4–5 (1987) (noting the deterrent effect of torts); see also Ernest J. Weinrib, The Morsanto 
Lectures: Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 501–02 (1989); see also Gary T. 
Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997).  An ethical component via compensation is also frequently 
proffered as a justification for imposing tort liability.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 6 cmt. d (2010) (“One justification for imposing liability for negligent 
conduct that causes physical harm is corrective justice; imposing liability remedies an injustice 
done by the defendant to the plaintiff.  An actor who permits conduct to impose a risk of physical 
harm on others that exceeds the burden the actor would bear in avoiding that risk impermissibly 
ranks personal interests ahead of the interests of others.  This, in turn, violates an ethical norm of 
equal consideration when imposing risks on others.  Imposing liability remedies this violation.”); 
see also Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 
35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 300 (2001). 
 19. See, e.g., STEVEN E. PEGALIS, § 1.4. Risk of Liability as a Deterrent to Malpractice, AM. 
LAW MED. MALP. (3d ed. 2013) (arguing, inter alia, that the tort system acts as an “external force” 
that compensates victims while also helping to improve medical care through the threat of 
embarrassment and economic loss); FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE 3 (2008); Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice 
Litigation as a Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 56–64 (2011) (adding the articulation of new 
duties of care and “expos[ing] obtuse organizations”); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines 
as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 94–95 
(1991) (noting that “Malpractice law is usually said to have two coequal objectives: compensating 
injured persons and deterring medical negligence”). 
 20. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 6, cmt. d; 
Havighurst, supra note 19, at 94. 
 21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 6, Comment d; see also, e.g., 
Havighurst, supra note 19, at 95; Weinrib, supra note 18, at 511. 
 22. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 18, at 312–13. 
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evidence to suggest that it is unduly costly and leads to fruitless anxiety for many 
physicians.23  Numerous studies have found that only a small fraction of those 
negligently injured in the receipt of health care seek redress for the harm they 
suffer.24  Yet, for those who do sue, seeking compensation is more haphazard than 
it ought to be.  Substantial evidence suggests, on the one hand, that the size of the 
ultimate payout increases with the seriousness of a plaintiff’s injury.25  This is as it 
should be. However, other evidence suggests that, among similar classes of cases, 
an award or settlement in one suit has, at most, only a modest bearing on outcomes 
in others.26  Physicians give undue credence to the notion that the threat of suit is 
omnipresent, and physicians claim this threat must be met through the use of costly 
defensive medicine.27  Unpredictability about the possible amount of money at 
stake contributes to psychological stress on the part of all parties and diminishes the 
 
 23. Numerous works detail the problems with the medical malpractice system in the United 
States.  For a sampling see, e.g., SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 19, at 27–83; TOM BAKER, THE 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 22–67(2007); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical 
Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 
1088–1111 (2006); Laura D. Hermer & Howard Brody, Defensive Medicine, Cost Containment, 
and Reform, 25 J. GENERAL INTERNAL MED. 470 (2010). 
 24. The Harvard Medical Practice Study is the classic evaluation of this issue.  Troyen A. 
Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of 
the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991).  While other of the 
study’s conclusions have been criticized, the conclusion that most patients injured as a result of 
medical malpractice never sue has been well substantiated elsewhere.  See, e.g., Tom Baker, 
Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice Study Conclusions About the Validity of Medical 
Malpractice Claims, 33 J. L. Med. & ETHICS 501, 502 (2005). 
 25. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS IN SEVEN STATES, 2000–
2004 1 (6 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau Statistics 2007), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mmicss04.pdf; see also Randall R. Bovbjerg et al.,, 
Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering", 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 920 
(1989). 
 26. See, e.g., SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 19, at 115 (citing Edward J. McCaffery et al.,, 
Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 24 VA. L. REV. 1341 
(1995); Eric Helland & Alexander Taborrok, Race, Poverty, and American Tort Awards, 32 J. 
LEGAL STUDIES 27 (2003); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and 
Other Personal Injuries Created Equal?, 54 L. CONTEMP. PROB. 5 (1991)); Bovbjerg et al., supra 
note 25, at 920, 923–24. 
 27. See Brenda E. Sirovich et al., Too Little? Too Much? Primary Care Physicians’ Views on 
US Health Care, 171 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 1582, 1584 (Sept. 26, 2011); Carolyn M. Hettrich 
et al., The Costs of Defensive Medicine, AAOS NOW (Dec. 2010), 
http://www6.aaos.org/news/PDFopen/PDFopen.cfm?page_url=http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosno
w/dec10/advocacy2.asp; MASS. MED. SOC’Y, INVESTIGATION OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 4–6 (Nov. 2008), available at 
http://www.ncrponline.org/PDFs/2008/Mass_Med_Soc.pdf; K. J. O’Leary et al., Medical 
Students’ and Residents’ Clinical and Educational Experiences with Defensive Medicine, 87 
ACADEMIC MED. 142 (2012).  Concerning unpredictability regarding the relevant standard of 
care, see also Havighurst, supra note 19, at 99–100 (“It is striking that the main reasons why 
physicians now feel oppressed by malpractice law are (1) that the professional standards on which 
the law relied turned out to be so imprecise and variable as to leave juries wide discretion in 
imposing liability and (2) that the medical profession gradually lost its previous ability to 
influence the testimony of physician witnesses.”). 
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deterrence value of the threat of suit; hence, for example, physicians in Texas 
expressed their continued fear of suit nearly ten years after strict limitations were 
instituted on noneconomic damages and malpractice cases accordingly declined 
precipitously.28  Unpredictability may also make it more difficult for parties to 
settle a case due to differing expectations regarding possible verdict size.29  Costs 
of suit for successful plaintiffs can consume between one-third and one-half (or 
more) of the award or settlement.30  On average, successful plaintiffs only receive 
about half of their total reward, with the rest consumed by attorneys’ fees, expert 
witness fees, and costs.31  Altogether, medical malpractice law falls far short of its 
ostensible goals.  
Worse yet, traditional tort reforms proffered to address problems in our 
medical malpractice system are not intended to better address the presumed goals 
of that system.32  Rather, they take malpractice lawsuits themselves to be the 
problem.  Traditional tort reform efforts assume that such suits result in reduced 
access to medical malpractice coverage for health care providers, as well as 
reduced access and higher prices for health care consumers, and therefore seek to 
make suits more difficult to bring.33  In this, efforts over the last decade, in 
 
 28. Although a much lower percentage than the forty percent of U.S. physicians who gave a 
corresponding answer, twenty-seven percent of Texas physicians still identified 
“liability/defensive medicine pressures” as one of the two factors they found most unsatisfying 
about medical practice.  PHYSICIANS FOUND., A SURVEY OF AMERICA’S PHYSICIANS: PRACTICE 
PATTERNS AND PRESSURES, QUESTION 16 (2012), available at 
http://www.texmed.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=25570.   
 29. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 19, at 115.  
 30. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 19, at 4; see also David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, 
and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 
2031 (2006), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa054479#t=articleTop) 
(finding that fifty-four percent of plaintiffs’ awards were consumed by administrative expenses); 
TOWERS WATSON, U.S. TORT COST TRENDS: 2011 UPDATE 8 (2012), available at 
http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/6282/Towers-Watson-Tort-Report.pdf (finding that 
administrative expenses alone, excluding prosecution and defense costs, as well as costs of court, 
averaged 24.3% of total awards between 2000 and 2010). 
 31. See JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN 
TORT LITIGATION 41 (1986), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/ 
2006/R3391.pdf.  
 32. Traditional reforms are generally designed to make claims more difficult for plaintiffs to 
bring, and to limit certain types of damages for successful plaintiffs. Examples of such reforms 
include hard caps on non-economic damages, tightened statutes of limitations, more onerous 
expert report requirements for plaintiffs, and limits on attorneys’ fees.   
 33. A number of state legislatures have been quite explicit on this point.  See N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §41-5-2 (2013) (“The purpose of the Medical Malpractice Act is to promote the health and 
welfare of the people of New Mexico by making available professional liability insurance for 
health care providers in New Mexico”); Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1121 (Kan. 2012) 
(finding that the state legislature enacted a cap on noneconomic damages “in an attempt to reduce 
and stabilize liability insurance premiums by eliminating both the difficulty with rate setting due 
to the unpredictability of noneconomic damages awards, and the possibility of large noneconomic 
damage awards”); Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (“The 
purpose of the damages limitation was to control increases in health care costs by reducing the 
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particular, have often been quite successful.34  The system’s original aims, 
however, are left behind in the process.35  There is no good evidence that traditional 
reforms deter error or provide fairer compensation to victims.36  Nevertheless, at 
most levels of politics and mainstream public discourse, traditional reforms 
continue to represent nearly the only game in town.37  
It is outside the scope of this article to examine why so many physicians and 
politicians continue to advocate traditional tort reforms.  Rather, the objective is 
more forward-looking: to see how we might alter our medical liability regime in 
order to better achieve the professed goals of our malpractice system.  Given salient 
changes taking place in our health care system, however, further evaluation of these 
goals is in order.  The present development of public and private incentives that 
favor integrated practice and an emphasis on health care outcomes means that the 
dynamics and financial rewards of health care practice are changing.38  While 
integrated care is little more than a rumor to physicians in some places, there has 
been substantial progress in many regions of the nation in achieving coordination 
of care among providers.39  Quantification of the quality and patient-centeredness 
 
liability of medical care providers, thereby reducing malpractice insurance premiums, a large 
component of health care costs.”); Scoresby v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546, 552 (Tex. 2011) 
(“Fundamentally, the goal of the MLIIA and the Medical Liability Act has been to make health 
care in Texas more available and less expensive by reducing the cost of health care liability 
claims.”). 
 34. See Myungho Paik et al., The Receding Tide of Medical Malpractice Litigation Part 2: 
Effect of Damage Caps, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 612, 619 (2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2285230&download=yes (finding strong, 
consistent evidence that caps on non-economic damages reduce paid claim rates and the payout 
per claim, which jointly produce a substantial drop in payout per physician); ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
PENN. COURTS, TABLE 1: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE FILINGS (2012), available at 
http://www.pacourts.us/NR/rdonlyres/466B0CA3-96DF-4081-9A20-
CFF26728D4D4/0/Table1MedMalCaseFilings200011.pdf (showing a 43.3% decline in case 
filings since 2002, following tort reform measures enacted in 2003 and subsequent years). 
 35. See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation 
as a Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 44 (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2011365&download=yes (stating that all 
proposed reforms in past years have confused even the most “thoughtful reformers,” who 
succumb to the ideas of turning everything over to the health courts or the idea of provider-run 
alternative dispute resolution approaches, therefore missing the main point of healthcare, which is 
to help injured patients). 
 36. Id. at 42–44. 
 37. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) offers, however modestly, a 
change from this trend. See infra Part II.A. 
 38. See infra, Part II.B.1. 
 39. See Melanie Evans, Still Seeking Best Practices, MODERN HEALTHCARE (July 27, 2013), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130727/MAGAZINE/307279954 (reporting that 
while most of the entities surveyed in Modern Healthcare’s annual survey of ACOs tracked care-
coordination efforts, some failed to do so altogether). 
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of care delivered are becoming increasingly important as both public and private 
payers change reimbursement methodologies to prioritize these metrics.40 
Taking these developments into account, the commonly proffered aims of 
error deterrence and compensation of victims certainly should both remain and 
improve.41  Yet one more aim should be added: promotion of quality of care, 
particularly in an integrated setting.  Merely because physicians must meet a 
relevant standard of care in order to successfully defend themselves against a 
medical malpractice suit does not mean that they met an appropriate quality 
metric.42  More than a decade after the Institute of Medicine’s groundbreaking 
report on medical error, health care remains, in many respects, as dangerous as it 
was when the report was first issued.43  This is true despite the development and 
implementation of adverse event monitoring and quality improvement systems on 
both local and national levels.44  In many respects, the malpractice deck is stacked 
 
 40. See, e.g., BlueCross Announces Bundled Payment Agreements With Leading Orthopedic 
Groups in Tennessee, BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD (May 22, 2012), 
http://www.bcbs.com/healthcare-news/plans/bluecross-announces-bundled.html; Dale Shaller, 
Patient-Centered Care: What Does It Take?, COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 1–2, 21 (Oct. 2007), 
www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Shaller_patient-centeredcarewhatdoesittake_1067.pdf   
 41. See William M. Sage et al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health Care 
Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J. L. MED. 1, 2 (1994); Randall A. Bovbjerg & Lawrence R. 
Tancredi, Liability Reform Should Make Patients Safer, 33 J. L. Med. Ethics 478 (2005); Ronen 
Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in the U.S. Health Care System, 
37 AM. J. L. MED. 7, 10 (2011). 
 42. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the 
U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
893, 949–50 (2005) (discussing examples in which physicians resisted efforts to study patient 
outcomes in an effort to determine best practices, wishing instead to follow their traditional 
standards of care even though suboptimal outcomes might result). 
 43. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 53–57 (Linda T. 
Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, & Molla S. Donaldson, eds., 2000).  See also, e.g., Carolyn M. Clancy, 
Where We Are a Decade After To Err Is Human, 5 J. PATIENT SAFETY 199, 199 (2009); 
Christopher P. Landrigan, Gareth J. Parry, Catherine B. Bones et al., Temporal Trends in Rates of 
Patient Harm Resulting from Medical Care, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2124, 2130 (2010).  
 44. See, e.g., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, AHRQ PATIENT SAFETY 
PROJECT REDUCES BLOODSTREAM INFECTIONS BY 40% 1 (Sept. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.hret.org/news/resources/AHRQ_Patient_Safety_Project_Reduces_Bloodstrem_Infecti
on_40Percent_09102012.pdf; David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Healthcare Quality, Patient 
Safety, and the Culture of Medicine: “Denial Ain’t Just a River in Egypt”, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
417, 428–35 (2012), available at http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/LawReview/Vol46/3/Hyman-
Silver%20FINAL.pdf (providing several examples of cultural shifts in local or specialty medical 
practice that led to significant improvements in quality of care); Carolyn M. Clancy, Patient 
Safety: One Decade after To Err Is Human, PATIENT SAFETY & QUALITY HEALTHCARE (Oct. 
2009), http://www.psqh.com/septemberoctober-2009/234-september-october-2009-ahrq.html). 
Yet even so, substantial problems remain with adverse event monitoring, among other issues. See, 
e.g., STUART WRIGHT, MEMORANDUM REPORT: FEW ADVERSE EVENTS IN HOSPITALS WERE 
REPORTED TO STATE ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYSTEMS 3–4 (July 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.healthlawyers.org/News/Health%20Lawyers%20Weekly/Documents/072712/oei-06-
09-00092[1].pdf (finding that even with the passage of the Patient Safety and Quality 
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against inducing health care providers to favor a more integrated, systems-based 
approach to patient care.45  Numerous roadblocks must be surmounted, not the least 
of which includes fragmentation of care due to proprietary and financial interests 
and the medical culture.46  If there is some way to use the malpractice system to 
motivate providers to offer better-coordinated, higher-quality health care, we ought 
to give it serious consideration.  
II.  POTENTIAL LIABILITY REFORMS, POST HEALTH CARE REFORM 
The problem of continued and substantial deficiencies in quality of care 
suggests that, if there is any basis to a deterrence theory of medical malpractice 
law, we need to examine how better to align the law with current efforts to meet 
specific quality standards in medicine.  Most physicians presently have substantial 
latitude to determine diagnostic methods and treatments for most conditions.47  
Disease management can vary widely from location to location, and may differ as 
much based on exposure to a given method of training or local convention as on 
what is most likely to yield the best outcome.48  Multiple cases exist where a 
sizeable percentage of physicians continue to utilize a discredited disease 
management or surgical methodology, even after one or more definitive studies are 
 
Improvement Act of 2005, and the National Healthcare Quality Report that monitors adverse 
events, patient safety has worsened). 
 45. See, e.g., Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Human: 
What Have We Learned? 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2384, 2387–88 (2005) (noting that the current 
complex culture of medicine is difficult to improve due to the array of specialties, subspecialties, 
and lack of leadership at hospitals and in health plans, and lack of a common vision). 
 46. Id. at 2387 (stating that various aspects of healthcare, including “complexity, professional 
fragmentation, and a tradition of individualism, enhanced by a well-entrenched hierarchical 
authority structure and diffuse accountability”, form a “daunting barrier” to creating a safe culture 
in healthcare). 
 47. See, e.g., Reidar Tyssen et al., Physicians’ Perceptions of Quality of Care, Professional 
Autonomy, and Job Satisfaction in Canada, Norway, and the United States, 13 BMC HEALTH 
SERVICES RES. 516 (2013), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6963-
13-516.pdf (finding that a substantial majority of physicians practicing in the United States agree 
or strongly agree that they possess clinical freedom). 
 48. See Paul S. Chan et al., Appropriateness of Percutaneous Coronary Intervention, 306 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 53, 53, 60 (2011), available at http://mhcc.dhmh.maryland.gov/cardiacadvisory/ 
Documents/sp.mhcc.maryland.gov/cardiac_advisory/Chan%20et%20al%20JAMA2011(306)53-
61%20PCI%20AUC.pdf (finding that 38% of nonacute indications for PCI were “uncertain” and 
nearly 12% were “inappropriate;” additionally, “rates of inappropriate PCI varied markedly at the 
hospital level”); Stephen M. Bowman et al., Hospital Characteristics Associated with the 
Management of Pediatric Splenic Injuries, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2611, 2614 (2005), available 
at http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=201924 (finding that, where nonsurgical 
management was more appropriate, children with splenic injuries were significantly more likely to 
receive a splenectomy at general hospitals, rather than at children’s hospitals or level I or II 
trauma centers); Jonathan C. Routh et al., Variation in Surgical Management of Vesicoureteral 
Reflux: Influence of Hospital and Patient Factors, 125 PEDIATRICS e446, e450 (2010) (finding 
that the most important factor driving management for VUR was the hospital at which a patient 
was treated). 
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published that show the ineffectiveness or even harmfulness of that methodology,.49  
It is certainly true that, in the case of many conditions, there exists no clearly 
superior management or treatment strategy.50  However, where such does exist, or 
where widely used strategies have been convincingly shown to not work or be 
harmful, then this should be recognized in malpractice cases. 
At least two possibilities exist for better aligning medical malpractice law 
with adherence to available quality metrics: use of clinical practice guidelines to 
establish the applicable standard of care, and adoption of enterprise liability for 
affiliated physicians.  As will be shown below, however, only one of them has 
substantial potential to meet not only the goals of deterring negligence and 
promoting appropriate quality measures, but also the goal of more regularly and 
uniformly compensating injured patients.51  
A. Clinical Practice Guidelines 
While the ACA offers little in the way of direct change to the malpractice 
system, it is generous in providing means by which malpractice reform might 
piggyback on delivery reform and health care quality improvements to make 
substantial headway in addressing these proposed goals.52  Ideally, we want, among 
other goals, a malpractice system that meshes well with efforts to improve quality 
of care.  The ACA focuses substantial attention on improving quality of care. 
Among other provisions, it supports research and implementation of best practices 
 
 49. Notable examples include studies contraindicating routine postmenopausal hormone use 
in women, contraindication of arthroscopies for arthritis of the knee, and stenting patients for 
stable coronary artery disease. JoAnn E. Manson et al., Estrogen Plus Progestin and the Risk of 
Coronary Heart Disease, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 523, 533 (2003); Alexandra Kirkley et al., A 
Randomized Trial of Arthroscopic Surgery for Osteoarthritis of the Knee, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1097, 1103–04 (2008); William E. Boden, Robert A. O’Rourke, Koon K. Teo et al., Optimal 
Medical Therapy with or without PCI for Stable Coronary Disease, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1503, 
1506-09 (2007). For further information, see generally Vinay Prasad et al., A Decade of Reversal: 
An Analysis of 146 Contradicted Medical Practices, 88 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 790 (2013), 
available at http://download.journals.elsevierhealth.com/pdfs/journals/0025-
6196/PIIS0025619613004059.pdf (out of 363 articles published in the New England Journal of 
Medicine between 2001 and 2010 that tested an established medical practice, 146 of the studies 
found the standard of care under review to be either no better or worse than either the prior 
standard of care or omission altogether). 
 50. See, e.g., John T. Wei et al., Comprehensive Comparison of Health-Related Quality of 
Life After Contemporary Therapies for Localized Prostate Cancer, 32 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 
557 (2002), available at http://jco.ascopubs.org/content/20/2/557.full.pdf+html (finding that each 
method of treatment for prostate cancer had its own associated morbidities that could adversely 
affect health-related quality of life). 
 51. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 52. See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Health Care Reform and Medical Malpractice Claims, 38 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 871, 871 (2010) (suggesting that the ACA may lead to a decrease in adverse 
events and an increase in the quality of patient care because of “better coordination through 
continuity of care and ‘medical homes,’” electronic health records, and greater emphasis on 
evidence-based medicine). 
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via funding of patient-centered outcomes research53 and payment reductions for 
both hospital readmissions54 and development of hospital-acquired conditions.55  
The use of best practices could arguably be both complemented and furthered by 
reforming medical malpractice law to expand the use and importance of 
appropriately-developed clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) in medical malpractice 
cases.  The Institute of Medicine defines CPGs as “statements that include 
recommendations intended to optimize patient care that are informed by a 
systematic review of evidence and an assessment of the benefits and harms of 
alternative care options.”56  If used at all, CPGs are generally employed at present 
in malpractice cases to help buttress or rebut expert testimony regarding the 
standard of care.57  Under appropriate circumstances, however, a number of 
commentators have suggested that CPGs could be used to establish that standard of 
care without the need for expert testimony.  For the defense, CPGs could provide a 
safe harbor if followed appropriately, or, alternatively, a rebuttable presumption of 
malpractice for the plaintiff if unheeded.58  
As many commentators observe, using CPGs as a safe harbor for medical 
practice is attractive on initial observation because it would replace the current 
uncertainty with what appear to be gold-standard recommendations developed by 
experts.  Mark Hall states, for example, that 
[p]ractice policies offer a potentially powerful mechanism for 
rehabilitating the role of custom in defending against malpractice 
charges. The breakdown between the theory that the law applies a rule 
of professional custom and the practice of many malpractice trials 
occurs for the very reason that the law has always presumed the 
 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(c) (West 2014). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(p) (West 2014). 
 55. Id. § 1395ww(q).  See also, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: LOWERING MEDICARE COSTS BY IMPROVING CARE 3–5 (2012), 
available at http://www.cms.gov/apps/files/aca-savings-report-2012.pdf (noting the different ways 
that ACA supports payment reductions for hospital readmissions and the goal of reducing 
hospital-acquired conditions). 
 56. INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST 4 (Robin Graham et al., 
eds., 2011). 
 57. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 41, at 19; Andrew L. Hyams et al., Medical Practice 
Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation: An Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 289 
(1996); Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 665 (2001). 
 58. Whether both plaintiffs and defendants should be able to use CPGs as evidence in 
malpractice suits has been debated. Thus, for example, some have argued that CPGs should only 
be available as evidence that a defendant followed the standard of care, and should be unavailable 
to plaintiffs to prove the contrary given, for example, accepted variations in practice that may not 
be adequately captured by guidelines, whereas others hold that both plaintiffs and defendants 
should be able to make use of CPGs in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The 
Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 119, 131 (1991); Andrew L. Hyams et al., supra note 57, at 310–11. 
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existence of that which does not exist—established, concrete 
professional standards. Because the law has operated in an unreal 
twilight zone that assumes professional consensus when in fact much 
of medical practice is governed by instinct and localized habit, 
malpractice suits have tended to degenerate into individual skirmishes 
between opposing experts. Malpractice law can be vastly improved, 
then, by greater rationalization and standardization of medical 
practice.59 
Those who support the use of guidelines as a safe harbor accept, whether implicitly 
or explicitly, that we should encourage improved regularity in physician practice.60  
In its most ideal form, the use of CPGs as defensive safe harbors61 could provide 
physicians with a safer strategy for protecting themselves from liability, while at 
the same time providing physicians with a substantial incentive to adopt proven 
best practices.62  Using CPGs as defensive safe harbors could also facilitate 
national harmonization of practice.63  Depending on how CPGs were used, it could 
also further a more population-based approach to medical practice and reduce 
defensive medicine.64  
However, there are some significant problems with relying on guidelines in 
this fashion.  First, developing reliable, unbiased, and sound guidelines has 
historically been notoriously tricky, given the varying interests of the relevant 
 
 59. See Hall, supra note 58, at 129–30. 
 60. Id. at 144 (“It is impossible for physicians to have both wide clinical discretion and, at the 
same time, freedom from scrutiny in malpractice litigation, nor is it appropriate to make an across-
the-board choice between these two extremes. Where the science is clear, there should be a single, 
national standard. Where there is more divergence of opinion, conflicting, but still respectable, 
standards will be seen.”); see also Avraham, supra note 41, at 16, 30–31 (noting problems with 
the diffusion of medical innovations and best practices in the medical field and proposing the 
implementation of a system of privately-developed clinical practice guidelines with liability 
protection to address these issues, among others).. 
 61. Plaintiffs can also use CPGs in an offensive manner.  See, e.g., Katharine Van Tassel, 
Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process: Moving from Tort Doctrine Toward Contract 
Principles Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1179, 1251, 1253–54 
(2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262898&download=yes 
(stating that courts have allowed offensive and defensive use of CPGs in the courtroom, and that 
offensive use by plaintiffs can be helpful if the physician has set a standard guideline to use in 
practice since the patient would clearly know which aspect of the guideline the physician failed to 
follow). 
 62. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 58, at 129–30. 
 63. Id. (arguing that use of guidelines in malpractice suits will encourage “rationalization and 
standardization “of practice across different localities). 
 64. See, e.g., Stefan Timmermans & Aaron Mauck, The Promises and Pitfalls of Evidence 
Based Medicine, 24 HEALTH AFF. 18, 19 (2005) (observing that evidence based medicine and 
resulting guidelines can be viewed as population-based recommendations resulting from the 
evaluation of the scientific basis for medical and surgical treatments); INST. OF MED., supra note 
56, at 172 (noting conflicts between the practice of defensive medicine and CPG use).   
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parties.65  As the Institute of Medicine noted in its discussion of how best to 
develop reliable CPGs, “the quality of CPG development processes and guideline 
developer adherence to quality standards have remained unsatisfactory and 
unreliable for decades.”66  Lack of unanimity, failure to consistently obtain 
independent review, commercial conflict of interest, and personal bias all 
complicate CPG development.67  Varieties of schema have been developed to 
address these problems, but  none has yet been systematically implemented.68  
Guidelines must also be easily and quickly amendable, with changes rapidly 
and effectively communicated to practitioners.69  If CPGs are not reliably kept up to 
date and published regularly where practitioners can easily find them,70 their utility 
 
 65. See Amir Qaseem, A Perspective on the Guidelines International Network and the 
Institute of Medicine’s Proposed Standards for Guideline Development, NAT’L GUIDELINE 
CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.guideline.gov/expert/printView.aspx?id=43913 
(stating that “concern about the varying quality of guideline development methodologies and 
recommendations” has led to frustration as there is “variation in the quality of evidence supporting 
the guidelines, lack of transparency, inadequate disclosure and management of actual or perceived 
conflicts of interests, concerns about the funding of CPG development, and a lack of agreement . . 
.”). 
 66. See INST. OF MED., supra note 56, at 2. 
 67. See, e.g., Allan D. Sniderman & Curt D. Furberg, Why Guideline-Making Requires 
Reform, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 429 (2009) (arguing that, among other protective measures, 
guideline committees should include epidemiologists, statisticians, and health policy experts, and 
that guidelines should both have an expiration date and undergo independent scientific review); 
Jennifer Newman et al., Prevalence of Financial Conflicts of Interest Among Panel Members 
Producing Clinical Practice Guidelines in Canada and United States: Cross Sectional Study, 343 
BMJ d5621 (2011), available at http://www.bmj.com/content/343/bmj.d5621.pdf%2Bhtml 
(finding that 52% of panelists who participated in developing guidelines on hyperlipidemia or 
diabetes published by national organizations between 2000 and 2010 had declared or undeclared 
conflicts of interest, and that, while only 16% of panelists on government-sponsored guidelines 
had conflicts, 69% of those on non-government sponsored guidelines did). 
 68. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 41, at 31 (arguing that we should have a “Private 
Regulation Regime,” where private entities develop guidelines and license them to be used by 
physicians, and where aggrieved patients could sue guideline developers for development of poor 
or negligently-created guidelines and payers could sue for developing excessively careful (and 
hence costly) guidelines); Arnold Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care 
Reform: An Update, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 21, 30–31 (2012) (addressing conflicts of interest and 
quality concerns by subjecting committee members to strict disclosure and COI requirements, 
making the process of creation transparent, and ultimately harmonizing competing guidelines); 
INST. OF MED., supra note 56, at 26 (guidelines should be based on systematic review of, and 
evaluation of the quality of, existing evidence, should provide a clear statement of the 
relationships between interventions and outcomes, and should be undertaken by a 
multidisciplinary panel of experts and key affected groups, with transparency concerning both 
process and conflicts of interest). 
 69. See Peter D. Jacobson, Transforming Clinical Practice Guidelines Into Legislative 
Mandates: Proceed with Abundant Caution, 299 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 208, 209 (2009); INSTIT. OF 
MED., supra note 56, at 146–47. 
 70. See Paul G. Shekelle et al., Validity of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
Clinical Practice Guidelines: How Quickly do Guidelines Become Outdated?, 286 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 1461, 1461 (2001) (noting that guidelines are not useful to physicians if they are not up to 
date and present updated information).  The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
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in support or defense of a malpractice suit becomes tenuous at best.  While the 
ACA makes provision for rapid dissemination of new guidelines and research 
findings, it is not enough that guidelines are available for physicians to read or 
otherwise obtain.71  Physicians must not only be aware of them, but also must put 
them into practice.  At least one recent study has found that while a large majority 
of physicians are aware of current guidelines that are relevant to their specialty, far 
fewer of them actually apply those guidelines.72  
Guidelines must be sufficiently flexible so they can be tailored, when 
relevant, to the particular needs of patients, yet not so lax as to lose much of their 
force.73  They must permit rather than penalize reasonable experimentation.74  
Finally, there are simply many circumstances in which, at least for the foreseeable 
future, no definitive guidelines will—or can—exist.75  These issues make it 
unlikely that CPGs could, on their own, provide a satisfactory and sufficient 
response to the problems inherent in our medical malpractice regime at present, or 
anytime in the near future.76  
B. Accountable Care Organizations and Enterprise Liability 
 
maintains the National Guideline Clearinghouse, where one can find not only guidelines that meet 
the NGC’s inclusion criteria, but also comparisons and syntheses of competing guidelines.  
National Guideline Clearinghouse – Compare Guidelines, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH 
AND QUALITY, http://www.guideline.gov/compare/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).  
 71. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 299c-3 (Supp. V 2010).  
 72. See, e.g., Sharon Mickan, Amanda Burls, & Paul Glasziou, Patterns of “Leakage” in the 
Utilisation of Clinical Guidelines: A Systematic Review, 87 POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 670, 674 
(2011) (finding that while the median rate of physician awareness of guidelines included in the 
studies was ninety percent, the median rate of adherence was only thirty-six percent). 
 73. Thus, for example, David Eddy, among others, has argued for the use of “individualized” 
guidelines, where “readily available” information obtained regarding each patient is used, where 
relevant, to tailor more general guidelines for the patient’s specific characteristics.  He and 
colleagues have, for example, published a study finding that, of a middle-aged cohort without a 
prior history of heart disease that was randomized into three treatment groups for hypertension – 
one receiving care according to the most recent set of guidelines, one receiving care according to 
individualized guidelines, and one receiving “random” care – both the best outcomes and lowest 
costs were incurred by the individualized guidelines group. David M. Eddy et al., Individualized 
Guidelines: The Potential for Increasing Quality and Reducing Costs, 154 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 629, 629, 631, 633 (2011). 
 74. See, e.g., Improving Physician Adherence to Clinical Practice Guidelines: Barriers and 
Strategies for Change, NEW ENG. HEALTHCARE INST. 1, 12–13 (2008) (discussing the importance 
of flexibility in CPGs in order to “accommodate provider judgment).  
 75. See supra, notes 67–68 and associated text. 
 76. See, e.g., Maxwell Mehlman, Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 
44 AZ. STATE. L REV. 1165, 1216-17 (2012) (citing, inter alia, the lack of consensus regarding 
what makes a standard “evidence based,” the disparity between real-world conditions and those 
pertaining in clinical trials, and the need to conform care to the situations of individual patients).  
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Clinical practice guidelines pose significant problems when contemplated for 
use as complete shields against malpractice liability.77  Yet perhaps an even greater 
problem that CPGs pose is their focus on individual, rather than coordinated, 
physician practice.  As Elliott Fisher and his colleagues observe, the U.S. health 
care system’s focus on individual providers 
. . . reflects the historical development, oversight mechanisms, and 
payment systems that prevail in the U.S. health care system and the 
interest of providers to be held accountable only for care that is within 
their direct control. The limitations of this approach are increasingly 
apparent. The provision of high quality care for any serious illness 
requires coordinated, longitudinal care and the engagement of 
multiple professionals across different institutional settings. Also, 
many of the most serious gaps in quality can be attributed to poor 
coordination and faulty transitions.78 
Improved quality of care, as discussed earlier, depends in part on 
defragmenting our health care delivery.79  The ACA enacts a number of 
demonstration projects designed to do precisely that.80  The following section 
discusses perhaps the most prominent of these projects: ACOs designed to 
participate in the MSSP.  It then considers how best to alter our medical liability 
regime to support the goals of ACOs. 
1.  Accountable Care Organizations 
The ACA is concerned not only with researching and encouraging the 
implementation of best practices, but also with finding better ways to integrate and 
coordinate patient care.81 Accordingly, the most prominent of the Medicare 
 
 77. See Mello, supra note 57, at 649 (discussing how the use of CPGs can be problematic 
because CPGs do not represent prevailing medicine, and discussing how allowing CPGs to be 
used as an affirmative defense while preventing plaintiffs from using them offensively could 
create problems). 
 78. Elliott Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital 
Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. w44, w44–w45 (2006). 
 79. See supra Part I; see also THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND 
SOLUTIONS, 15–20, (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/Elhauge%20The%20Fragmentation%20of%20U
S%20Health%20Care%20--%20Introductory%20Chpt.pdf (discussing reforms that may help 
defragment health care in the United States). 
 80. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 294j(a) (Supp. V 2010) 
(discussing demonstration program to integrate quality improvement and patient safety training). 
 81. See, e.g., Pub.L. 111-148, Title II, § 2704, Mar. 23, 2010, 124 Stat. 323 (establishing the 
Medicaid bundled payment demonstration program); 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4(a)(1) (West 2014) 
(establishing the Medicare bundled payment demonstration program); 42 U.S.C. § 256a-1(a) 
(establishing “community-based, interdisciplinary, interprofessional teams” to support primary 
care practices). 
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demonstration projects authorized by the ACA are intended to facilitate health care 
integration. Chief among them are ACOs under the MSSP: groups of health care 
providers and institutions that work together to manage and coordinate the care of 
traditional Medicare beneficiaries, and who ultimately share responsibility for both 
the cost and quality of the care provided.82  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) envisages MSSP ACOs as having a “three-part aim” of achieving: 
“(1) better care for individuals; (2) better health for populations; and (3) lower 
growth in Medicare Parts A and B expenditures.”83  If ACOs and other coordinated 
care organizations ultimately take root, our malpractice regime will need to 
function effectively in conjunction with them.  This will entail more than just 
cosmetic changes, as will be discussed further below.84 
Models for ACOs predate the ACA.85  Examples include Geisinger Health, 
Community Care of North Carolina, and Kaiser Permanente, among others.86  
While most pre-existing models are large, multispecialty group practices serving 
tens of thousands of often privately-insured patients, the ACA’s MSSP requires 
only that an ACO serve a minimum of 5,000 Medicare beneficiaries87 and that the 
ACO offer a variety of potential practice organizational forms, including physician-
led practice networks, individual hospital systems, partnerships between hospitals 
and physician groups, and affiliations among health insurers, hospital systems, and 
physician networks.88  Regardless of the model chosen, participants are responsible 
for managing and coordinating their patients’ care in an effort to both reduce costs 
and improve quality.89  Each ACO must accordingly have a sufficient number of 
 
 82. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.100(a) (2012).  
 83. Id. § 425.108(a). 
 84. See infra section II.B.2. 
 85. See, e.g., Francis J. Crosson, 21st-Century Health Care – The Case for Integrated 
Delivery Systems, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1324, 1324 (2009) (discussing how in 1933 the 
Committee on the Costs of Medical Care published its findings and recommendations that medical 
services should consist of groups of physicians and related practitioners in order to maintain a 
high standard of care and to maintain a personal relationship between physicians and patients). 
 86. Id. (noting that although the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care recommended a 
transition to group practice environments, the Mayo Clinic, the Geisinger Health System, and 
Kaiser Permanente were among the few organizations that actually followed the 
recommendation). 
 87. 42 C.F.R § 425.110(a)–(b) (providing for termination of an ACO’s participation 
agreement with CMS if the number of Medicare beneficiaries assigned to it drops below 5,000 for 
more than one performance year).  
 88. See id. § 425.102(a).  For examples of ACOs formed to date, see, e.g., Molly Gamble, 80 
Accountable Care Organizations to Know, BECKER’S HOSPITAL REVIEW (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-physician-relationships/60-accountable-care-
organizations-to-know.html.  
 89. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.100(a) (“Under the Shared Savings Program, ACO participants may 
work together to manage and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries through 
an ACO that meets the criteria specified in this part. The ACO must become accountable for the 
quality, cost, and overall care of the Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to the 
ACO.”). 
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participating primary care providers (PCPs) to care for its Medicare ACO 
population.90  Solo PCPs are restricted to participating in only one ACO at any 
given time; those PCPs who practice in a group are not similarly bound.91  Because 
CMS chose to permit Medicare beneficiaries to be assigned to ACOs on the basis 
of primary care delivered by specialists as well as generalists, this means that 
specialists who deliver primary care also fall under these rules.92  
Whether an individual physician participates in only one ACO or in multiple 
ones, both the cost and quality of the physician’s care is included in the overall cost 
and quality data that will be key not merely to CMS’s determinations of an ACO’s 
cost-effectiveness but also to the ACO’s payment.93  In most cases, Medicare 
payment is made pursuant to the present fee-for-service system.94  However, the 
choices that ACO providers make regarding the quality and quantity of the patient 
care that they collectively deliver will ultimately affect their earnings.95 CMS is 
responsible for developing risk-adjusted and updateable cost benchmarks for each 
ACO based on the per capita Part A and B expenditures for Medicare beneficiaries 
who would have been assigned to the ACO in the preceding three years.96  ACOs 
that meet quality standards and save at least a specific, minimum percentage of the 
cost benchmark97 are eligible to receive a percentage of the savings realized by 
CMS, up to a cap.98  Those that exceed the applicable cost benchmark by at least 
 
 90. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.110(a)(1). 
 91. 42 C.F.R. §§ 425.20 & 425.204(c)(5)(i).  CMS restricted solo physician participation to a 
single ACO to facilitate ACO evaluation based on the ACO’s unique patient group.  See Medicare 
Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,810 (Nov. 2, 
2011) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425). 
 92. Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 
76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,811 (Nov. 2, 2011) (codified at 42 C.F.R. part 425).  
 93. See 42 C.F.R. §425.500(a)–(b) (outlining the measures taken by CMS to assess the quality 
of care provided by the ACO).   
 94. 42 C.F.R. § 425.20.  Some ACOs may seek to opt for bundled, capitated, or other forms 
of payment while still participating in the Shared Savings Program. See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. at 
67,833, 67,905. 
 95. See, e.g., Elias N. Matsakis, Partnering with Hospitals to Create an Accountable Care 
Organization, in ACOS, CO-OPS, AND OTHER OPTIONS: A “HOW-TO” MANUAL FOR PHYSICIANS 
NAVIGATING IN A POST-HEALTH REFORM WORLD 4 (Am. Med. Ass’n, ed., 3d ed. 2012) (noting 
that savings will come from a reduction in operative interventions, changes in service location, 
preventive and supportive care to better manage chronic conditions, and reductions in 
readmissions and need for skilled nursing care).  
 96. 42 C.F.R. § 425.602(a)–(b).  The updates are based on the “projected absolute amount of 
growth of national per capita expenditures for Parts A and B services.” 42 C.F.R. § 425.602(b). 
 97. The applicable percentage ranges from 3.9% to 2% below the benchmark, depending on 
the track chosen and, for track 1 ACOs, the number of beneficiaries. 42 C.F.R. §§ 425.604(b) & 
425.606(b). 
 98. Id. § 425.606(e) (2012).  The first interim results from the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program were released in January 2014. Fifty-four of the 114 ACOs participating in the program 
in 2012 had lower expenditures than predicted, producing a net savings of $128 million. Of those 
fifty-four, twenty-nine generated sufficient savings to receive a share of the savings. Press 
Release: Medicare’s Delivery System Reform Initiatives Achieve Significant Savings and Quality 
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two percent will, depending on which of two tracks they opt for, ultimately be 
penalized.99  Presumably, if a critical mass of ACOs remains in the program as the 
penalizations go into effect, then the cost-efficiency bar will rise as ACOs 
increasingly endeavor to eke greater savings from the care that they provide 
without sacrificing quality.100  
The premium placed on the reduction of duplicated and unnecessary care is 
intended to place pressure on physicians who participate in ACOs to change their 
practice patterns.  As Fisher and colleagues observe,  
 
Improvement – Off to a Strong Start (Jan. 30, 2014), 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/01/20140130a.html.  
 99. 42 C.F.R. § 425.606(b)(2). While MSSP ACOs may opt for the “one-sided” track, in 
which they share in savings but not in losses, that track is available only for the first three- year 
agreement period. See id. § 425.600 (a)–(b). Only two of the ACOs in the MSSP that opted for the 
“two-sided” track generated shared losses in the first year. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., PERFORMANCE YEAR 1 INTERIM RESULTS FOR ACOS THAT STARTED IN APRIL OR JULY 
2012, available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/PY1-InterimResultsTable.pdf (last visited May 29, 
2014) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE YEAR 1 INTERIM RESULTS].  Pioneer ACOs, on the other hand, 
all started on two-sided tracks. See Medicare Program; Pioneer Accountable Care Organization 
Model: Request for Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,249, 29,250 (May 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-05-20/pdf/2011-12383.pdf.  Results for the first year 
show that two Pioneer ACOs had to share in losses, which totaled $4 million.  Press release: 
Pioneer Accountable Care Organizations Succeed in Improving Care, Lowering Costs (July 16, 
2013), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-Releases/2013-Press-
Releases-Items/2013-07-16.html.  Nine Pioneer ACOs left the program following the first year.  
Id. 
 100. Todd Freeman, a healthcare attorney, put the matter as follows: 
There is a good chance that this is “fool’s gold” in that thresholds under which 
the ACO must provide care to generate savings will likely drop if the programs 
are successful at all. For example, if the threshold in 2012 for a given ACO 
population of patients is $10 million and the ACO provides care at $8.5 million 
(with a $1.5 million savings), then it is unlikely that the threshold will remain at 
$10 million for that population very long. Rather, the new “standard” will be the 
$8.5 million which may be difficult, if not impossible, to generate an incentive 
payment under the shared savings program. It is also possible that once ACOs are 
established with identified participating providers, that CMS will institute a 
program of penalizing the ACOs for overutilization. For example, using the 
illustration described above, if the new threshold is set at the $8.5 million and the 
providers lose all hope that there is any possibility of future incentive payments, 
they could easily revert to their old ways and aggregate cost of care would rise to 
the $10 million level again. It is naïve to think that CMS, now having complete 
data from the ACO, would tolerate such an increase in cost. 
See TODD I. FREEMAN, AM. ASS’N OF ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGS., PHYSICIANS’ ACO 
DILEMMA: SHOULD WE OR SHOULDN’T WE? 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.larkinhoffman.com/files/OTHER/Physicians_ACO_Dilemma_PDF3.pdf.  While not 
quite analogous in certain fundamental respects, the history of managed care organization 
participation in the former Medicare+Choice program, in particular, suggests that ACOs may 
never reach this point unless ACO formation and participation become mandatory, or penalties are 
suspended or reduced, or other events occur to either encourage voluntary participation or make 
participation required.  See, e.g., Nancy-Ann DeParle, As Good as It Gets?: The Future of 
Medicare+Choice, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 495, 500–03 (2002). 
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. . . [h]igher spending across U.S. health systems is largely attributable 
to greater use of discretionary “supply sensitive” services: visits, 
specialist consultations, tests, imaging services, and the use of 
institutional settings (rather than outpatient settings) for care.  
Patients’ preferences do not explain these differences in care, and 
responses to survey-based clinical vignettes reveal that physicians in 
higher-spending systems have developed a more intensive practice 
pattern in exactly these discretionary clinical settings.101 
How much change participation in an ACO will ultimately yield is 
uncertain.102  Fisher and colleagues at the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and 
Clinical Practice suggest that, while physician services account for only around 
twenty percent of health care spending in the United States, physicians also have 
substantial influence over whether and how much of the remaining eighty percent 
is spent.103  Some believe that primary care physicians may be able to capitalize on 
this by claiming greater profit by participating in ACOs, while at the same time 
causing total health care spending to decline by reducing unnecessary 
hospitalizations, emergency department use, procedures, and medications, as well 
as preventing adverse events and avoidable readmissions.104  Indeed, this will likely 
be a necessary feature of achieving savings.105 
Yet more may be at stake than pure profit.  Participation in ACOs necessarily 
entails a certain amount of subordination of individual interest and self-direction to 
the common mission, if that common mission is to be successful.106  Inducing 
physician participation, particularly in ACOs that are spearheaded by institutions 
rather than physician groups, may be difficult, especially in regions of the country 
 
 101. Fisher et al., supra note 78, at w53. 
 102. Preliminary data from the first year of the Pioneer ACO demonstration yielded promising 
results, with Pioneer ACOs reporting better results than those reported in fee-for-service Medicare 
generally in all fifteen of the quality measures for which data was available.  See PERFORMANCE 
YEAR 1 INTERIM RESULTS, supra note 99. See also Kavita Patel & Steven Lieberman, Taking 
Stock of Initial Year One Results from Pioneer ACOs, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 25, 2013), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/07/25/taking-stock-of-initial-year-one-results-for-pioneer-acos/.  
 103. Fisher et al., supra note 78, at w53.; see also, e.g., HENRY J. KAISER FOUND., HEALTH 
CARE COSTS: A PRIMER 10 (2012), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7670-03.pdf.  
 104. See HAROLD D. MILLER, CENTER FOR HEALTHCARE QUALITY & PAYMENT REFORM, 
HOW TO CREATE ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.chqpr.org/downloads/HowtoCreateAccountableCareOrganizations.pdf.  See also, e.g., 
Harold D. Miller, Succeeding Under Shared Savings, Global Payment, and Other Payment 
Reforms, presented at the Annual Meeting of the AMA House of Delegates (June 18, 2012).  
Miller rightly notes that physicians’ share of any savings through an ACO will depend on a 
variety of factors, not the least of which include the nature of entities participating in the ACO and 
the composition of the ACO’s board membership. 
 105. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 105, at 2–4. 
 106. See, e.g., Fisher et al., supra note 78, at w55–w56. 
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where integrated care has not yet taken significant root.107  Physicians have long 
prized their clinical autonomy.108  Some have protested the gradual diminution of 
this autonomy in various respects over the last few decades.109  While physicians 
have acclimatized to numerous changes over the years, many show little sign of 
relenting in their opposition to new encroachments.110  Among some physicians, 
 
 107. Id. at w53–w54. 
 108. Id. (explaining that “[p]hysician practice and professional identity in the United States 
have long been characterized by a high degree of professional autonomy and a culture of 
individual responsibility—both of which are reinforced by current medical training, professional 
malpractice liability programs, and payment systems. Although there are numerous examples of 
physicians being deeply engaged in collaborating with hospital administrators and nurses to 
improve the delivery of care within their local systems, these remain relatively isolated examples 
in the broad mainstream of clinical practice. Many physicians will resist the notion of accepting a 
degree of responsibility for the care of all patients within their local delivery system.”). 
 109. Dr. Daniel H. Johnson, Jr., a former President of the American Medical Association, 
foretells the following regarding health reform, which was being debated at the time of his 
remarks:  
Once private insurance is crowded out by the unfair competitive tactics of the 
federal government intruding into an already flawed marketplace, it will be a 
simple matter to consolidate all of these different groups into one single entity. 
What does this mean to physicians and their patients? “Clinical effectiveness 
research,” when operated by government instead of the medical profession, will 
become “cost effectiveness” restrictions on what care is available and to whom—
determined by the federal government. It will only be a matter of a short time 
before Americans will enjoy the pleasures of “quality adjusted life years” wherein 
people my age will be denied services from which they might benefit because of 
their age and/or some other infirmity. We don’t have to make this stuff up: It is 
already the law of the land in some other developed countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, and has been long advocated here in the U.S. by voices from the left, 
including major media outlets. The federal government will exert total control over 
payment for all medical services. 
Daniel H. Johnson, Jr., Memo to My Fellow Physicians: We Have Reached the Moment of Truth, 
THE FOUNDRY (July 27, 2009, 3:40 PM), available at http://blog.heritage.org/2009/07/27/memo-
to-my-fellow-physicians-we-have-reached-the-moment-of-truth; see also, e.g., Robert Reinhold, 
Medical Leaders Growing Wary Over Reagan Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1981 (noting 
physician worries over possible rationing of care and use of health maintenance organizations for 
Medicaid recipients in the event of proposed budget cuts under President Reagan); HCPLEXUS, 
2011 NATIONAL PHYSICIANS SURVEY 29 (2011), available at 
http://mikemeikle.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/2011-thomson-reuters-hcplexus-national-
physicians-survey.pdf (finding that specialists, in particular, worry about losing autonomy under 
the Affordable Care Act); Bruce E. Landon et al., Changes in Career Satisfaction Among Primary 
Care and Specialist Physicians, 1997 – 2001, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 442, 447 (2003) (finding 
that changes in professional autonomy were among the most consistent predictors of changes in 
career satisfaction among both primary care and specialist physicians during the study period). 
 110. See, e.g., JASON FODEMAN, GALEN INST., THE NEW HEALTH LAW: BAD FOR DOCTORS, 
AWFUL FOR PATIENTS 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.galen.org/assets/NewHealthLaw_BadForDoctors_AwfulForPatients.pdf (arguing that 
the ACA will decrease physician autonomy, increase bureaucracy, and reduce satisfaction, thus 
causing older doctors to retire and younger doctors to switch careers). 
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their attitudes toward ACOs have been no exception.111 As Victor Fuchs and 
Leonard Schaeffer observe, “physicians’ traditional emphasis on autonomy runs 
counter to the standardization, group decision making, measurement of outcomes, 
and peer review that are important for the success of ACOs.”112  Ensuring that 
physicians are on board with their ACOs’ missions is critical if ACOs are to be 
successful.113  Money alone may be insufficient where other interests work at cross-
purposes with the goals that ACOs are intended to further.114  
The practical changes that ACOs would like affiliated health care providers to 
make will likely be a major point of conflict.  This returns us to the role of CPGs.  
ACOs, like many other health care entities, encourage—if not expect—
participating physicians to practice pursuant to guidelines developed and 
promulgated either in-house or by independent organizations.115  Physician 
adherence to guidelines is variable.116  Researchers have found adherence to depend 
on a variety of factors, including simplicity of comprehension and use, clarity of 
the guidelines’ scientific basis, and involvement by the targeted professionals in 
guideline development.117 Eliciting adherence can be even more problematic when 
 
 111. While ACOs have hardly precipitated a backlash of the sort seen concerning the rise of 
managed care or the sustainable growth rate in Medicare and while many physicians have been 
interested in participating in ACOs, other physicians have been more skeptical.  See, e.g., Daniel 
H. Johnson, Jr., Patient Beware of Accountable Care Organization, WASH. TIMES, (Oct. 27, 
2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/27/patient-beware-of-accountable-care-
organization/?page=all.  
 112. Victor R. Fuchs & Leonard D. Schaeffer, If Accountable Care Organizations Are the 
Answer, Who Should Create Them?, 307 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2261, 2262 (2012). 
 113. See HOWARD FREDRICK HAHN & TORRI A. CRIGER, ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATIONS: PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION REQUIRED, AHLA CONNECTIONS 25 (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.huschblackwell.com/~/media/Files/BusinessInsights/BusinessInsights/2011/01/Accou
ntable%20Care%20Organizations%20Physician%20Partici__/Files/Accountable%20Care%20Org
anizations%20Physician%20Partici__/FileAttachment/1101_AHLA.pdf.  
 114. See id. at 29 (explaining that education, customization, and addressing medical culture are 
needed to foster success in an integrated organization); MILLER, supra note 105, at 15 (noting 
problems in aligning the interests of primary care physicians and hospitals in ACOs). 
 115. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.122(b)(1) (providing in relevant part that ACOs “must define, 
establish, implement, evaluate, and periodically update processes to . . . promote evidence-based 
medicine[;] . . . [d]evelop an infrastructure for its ACO participants and ACO providers/ suppliers 
to internally report on quality and cost metrics that enables the ACO to monitor, provide feedback, 
and evaluate its ACO participants and ACO provider(s)/supplier(s) performance and to use these 
results to improve care over time . . . [; and] [c]oordinate care across and among primary care 
physicians, specialists, and acute and post-acute providers and suppliers.”). For examples of 
clinical practice guidelines promulgated by various entities, see National Guideline 
Clearinghouse, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., www.guideline.gov (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2013).  
 116. See, e.g., Mickan, Burls, & Glasziou, supra note 72; see also McDonnell Norms Group, 
Enhancing the Use of Clinical Guidelines: A Social Norms Perspective, 202 J. AM. C. SURGERY 
826, 827 (2006), available at http://www.jsmf.org/about/s/norms.pdf. 
 117. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra note 56, at 148; Anneke L. Francke, Organizational and 
Clinical Factors Influencing Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines, 8 BMC MEDICAL INFORMATICS 
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a stakeholder who may financially benefit from their use has developed the 
guidelines.118  ACOs present this situation.119  Physicians, hospitals, and other 
providers will, in most cases, continue to be paid as they presently are;120 whether 
or not they receive any shared savings through participation in the ACO depends on 
whether they and other providers have been sufficiently frugal in their provision of 
care while meeting quality targets.121  ACOs may encourage cost saving through 
the CPGs that they may adopt or promulgate.122  This may accordingly increase 
physicians’ skepticism of CPGs.123 Physicians may regard guidelines that prioritize 
both care coordination and cost control, in addition to quality care, as particularly 
problematic for the reasons discussed above.124  Finally, physicians may be 
particularly hesitant when following the guidelines will entail a significant 
deviation from their current practice.125  They, and not the ACO, will be the ones 
ultimately responsible for alleged negligence in adhering to the guidelines, yet cost 
control is not presently an accepted factor for physicians to consider in the 
diagnosis and treatment of patients, even though it would only be, at most, a 
secondary or tertiary factor in a physician’s discussion of treatment options.126 
 
AND DECISION MAKING 1, 6–7 (2012), available at 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6947-8-38.pdf.  
 118. See INST. OF MED., supra note 56, at 60–62; see also McDonnell Norms Group, supra 
116, at 828, 831. 
 119. Cf. INST. OF MED., supra note 56, at 188–89 (noting that the needs of organizations that 
create guidelines can create conflicts in certain circumstances). 
 120. See supra notes 95–100 and associated text. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See MILLER, supra note 105, at 3 (explaining that ACOs can reduce costs through the use 
of evidence-based treatment guidelines by promoting a reduction in unnecessary tests, 
interventions, and medications). 
 123. Cf. INST. OF MED., supra note 71, at 53–69 (noting issues negatively impacting guideline 
trustworthiness, including conflict of interest). 
 124. See Cynthia M. Farquhar et al., Clinicians’ Attitudes Toward Clinical Practice 
Guidelines: A Systematic Review, 177 MED. J. AUSTL. 502, 505 (2002) (finding, inter alia, that 
fifty-three percent of physicians surveyed in several countries, including the United States, 
believed that CPGs were intended to cut costs).  But see Marjorie E. Ginsburg et al., A Survey of 
Physician Attitudes and Practices Concerning Cost-Effectiveness in Patient Care, 173 WESTERN 
J. MED. 390, 393 (2000) (finding that physicians believed that cost-effectiveness of interventions 
was an appropriate factor to consider in patient treatment determinations). 
 125. See McDonnell Norms Group, supra note 116, at 831–32.  Critics of CPGs often deride 
CPGs as fostering “cookbook” medicine, rather than the practice of medicine as a craft.  See, e.g., 
Stefan Timmermans & Aaron Mauck, supra note 64, at 21 (citing O Constantini, KK Papp, J 
Como et al., Attitudes of Faculty, Housestaff, and Medical Students Towards Clinical Practice 
Guidelines, 74 ACADEMIC MED. 1138 (1999)). 
 126. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, When Patients Say No (to Save Money): An 
Essay on the Tectonics of Health Law, 41 CONN. L. REV. 743, 752-52 (2009) (“For the law to tell 
poor patients that ‘you get what you pay for’ would mean imposing virtually no lower limit on a 
doctor's performance. Judges are loath to have tort law ratify the social injustice of unaffordable 
health care.”). 
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To the extent that cost concerns are to become relevant in determining the 
appropriate standard of care, juries in medical malpractice suits will need to start 
taking cost into account as a relevant consideration.127  This will likely take time, 
given the expert-driven standard of care. In the meantime, providers who are first 
adopters may run a higher risk of liability for bad outcomes, even if their overall 
quality of care is superior.128  Accordingly, if an ACO wants physicians to buy-in to 
the standards it adopts or promulgates, it will need to be able to convince 
physicians that they will not suffer increased liability by following cost- and waste-
conscious CPGs that the ACO might promulgate.129  Physicians may be skeptical, 
however.  Short of ACOs offering indemnification to physicians for following the 
CPGs that they adopt, our medical malpractice system would have to change by, 
for example, permitting CPGs to be used as a shield in malpractice suits.  Yet this 
would, at minimum, entail addressing many of the problems raised by guideline 
development, choice, and uses that were discussed earlier.130  
2.  Enterprise Liability for ACOs 
As a different solution, it may instead be time once again to consider adopting 
exclusive enterprise liability, at least in the context of ACOs.  Enterprise liability 
would move the locus of liability from physicians and other individual health care 
providers to the enterprise in which or for which they work.131  It was most recently 
suggested in the 1990s, when health maintenance and other managed care 
organizations were ascending and were conceptualized as the “enterprise” in 
question.132  Although hospitals had originally been proposed as the liability-
 
 127. See, e.g., Christopher Smith, Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Physicians and the Clash 
of Liability Standards and Cost Cutting Goals Within Accountable Care Organizations, 20 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 165, 192–193 (2011) (reasoning that any changes to cost considerations in 
changing the medical liability standard of care, particularly within the ACO context, will have to 
await for either statutory enactments or the common law evolution). 
 128. See Michael D. Greenberg, Medical Malpractice and New Devices: Defining an Elusive 
Standard of Care, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 423, 432–33 (2009) (observing that, while adoption of a 
new device or technique may come with greater liability exposure at first, it may ultimately 
become the new standard of care over time). 
 129. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 159, at 194 (arguing that physicians may be concerned that 
quality standards set by an ACO may not match up with the same quality standards embodied 
within the standard of care). 
 130. See supra notes 86–96 and accompanying text. 
 131. See Myron F. Steves, Jr., A Proposal to Improve the Cost to Benefit Relationships in the 
Medical Professional Liability Insurance System, 1975 DUKE L. J. 1305, 1324–35 (1975) 
(suggesting that shifting the legal liability exposure, and the cost of insuring it, from individual 
practitioners to institutional providers would ameliorate the problem of increasing premiums while 
at the same time, strengthening incentives to prevent injuries).  
 132. Kenneth Abraham, Paul Weiler, & William Sage brought the concept into prominence in 
the 1990s, particularly in the context of the Clinton health reform proposal.  See Kenneth S. 
Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American 
Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 436 (1994) [hereinafter Enterprise Medical 
Liability]; Sage et al., supra note 41, at 2. 
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bearer,133 the prospect that a health care system based on managed care would 
come into being through the Clinton health reform proposal in the 1990s prompted 
some to suggest that managed care organizations should instead assume liability.134  
William Sage, Kathleen Hastings, and Robert Berenson argued, for example, that 
enterprise liability for managed care entities paid through capitation would make 
managed care entities bear the costs of substandard or inadequate care that they 
might otherwise be tempted to deliver in an effort to reduce expenses and increase 
profits.135  Managed care plans, they argued, have the ability to coordinate 
providers, manage health care delivery, and oversee quality, making it both 
economically and practically efficient for them to bear liability.136 
The Clinton health reform plan was never enacted, so the health coverage 
landscape that Sage and his co-authors contemplated did not come into being.137  
With the ACA, we now have a different landscape.138  Health plans are not being 
asked to tightly manage and oversee care; rather, groups of providers are, via 
clusters of demonstration projects involving care coordinated through delivery or 
financing innovations.139  ACOs constitute one such demonstration project, and 
arguably are the best suited of the different proposed models to support a system of 
enterprise liability.140  As they must be able to serve a large number of patients and 
to invest in the tracking and data management services the MSSP requires, their 
 
 133. See Steves, supra note 132, at 1324–25; see also Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, 
Enterprise Medical Liability and the Choice of the Responsible Enterprise, 20 AM. J. L. MED. 29, 
35 (1994).  
 134. See Sage et al., supra note 41, at 11–12. 
 135. See id. at 10–11 (“Because health plans will not be permitted to shed sicker patients 
through surcharges or other risk-selection strategies they will directly bear the cost of future 
medical care for enrollees, including additional medical expenses caused by medical malpractice.  
Future medical expenses comprise about half of economic damages and approximately one-
quarter of all damages.  By ‘internalizing’ these expenses into the cost of providing health 
insurance, national health care reform along the lines of the Clinton proposal should induce health 
plans to design health care delivery systems that balance the risk of undertreatment or 
mistreatment with the risk of overutilizing services.  Enterprise liability would in addition force 
plans to internalize the other components of malpractice damage awards, lost wages and pain and 
suffering, thereby requiring a health plan's quality and efficiency calculus to reflect complete cost 
information.”). 
 136. See id. at 11–14. 
 137. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 133, at 38. 
 138. See, e.g., H. Benjamin Harvey & I. Glenn Cohen, The Looming Threat of Liability for 
Accountable Care Organizations and What to do About It, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 141, 141 
(2013). 
 139. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1115A(b)(2)(B) (West 2014) (discussing various payment and 
delivery models that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, as established by the 
ACA, will prioritize when considering projects to fund); .42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4(a)(1) (West 2014) 
(establishing the Medicare bundled payment demonstration project); 42 U.S.C. § 256a-1(a) 
(establishing grants for community-based interdisciplinary teams to support primary care 
practices). 
 140. See, e.g., Harvey & Cohen, supra note 138, at 141–42 (arguing that enterprise liability is 
an appropriate solution for ACO health systems). 
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capitalization is likely to be greater than other, smaller entities.141  The larger ACOs 
will likely also have sufficient personnel and capacity not only to spread costs more 
thinly, but also to make use of risk rating.142  Additionally, as ACOs must collect 
substantial data regarding provider activities and patient outcomes, the tools and 
processes necessary to conduct risk rating will already be at their disposal.143   
Finally, and regardless of any developments with respect to enterprise 
liability, ACOs will almost certainly face the prospect of liability, whether on their 
own or in conjunction with other defendants, for alleged medical negligence 
through their provision of health care.144  Given that they will likely share exposure 
at times for their providers’ liability, and given the difficulty they may face in 
eliciting provider buy-in to cost containment and waste reduction measures they 
may adopt, it may make sense for them to assume the risk from their providers in 
exchange for better alignment of interests.  As discussed above, the success of an 
ACO depends on the coordinated efforts of multiple different healthcare providers 
seeking better and more economically efficient health outcomes for patient 
populations.  Choosing partners wisely will be important for ACO participants.145  
However, perhaps even more so than hospitals or even health maintenance 
organizations, which had originally been proposed as subjects for enterprise 
liability, ACOs will need to have the capacity to exercise a certain amount of 
control over participating health care providers in order to more reliably meet 
quality and cost targets.146  Given the need for such control, it makes sense that the 
 
 141. See, e.g., Sidney S. Welch, Accountable Care Organizations: Overview, in in ACOS, CO-
OPS, AND OTHER OPTIONS: A “HOW-TO” MANUAL FOR PHYSICIANS NAVIGATING IN A POST-
HEALTH REFORM WORLD 17 (Am. Med. Ass’n, ed., 3d ed. 2012), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/psa/physician-how-to-manual.pdf (noting that significant financial 
investment required for an ACO’s formation and operation requires deep pockets, significantly 
more so than is usually available to physician participants). 
 142. For example, Park Nicollet Health Services, one of the Pioneer ACOs, has 8,200 
employees, including 1,000 physicians. Pioneer ACOs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://data.cms.gov/dataset/Pioneer-ACO/izub-xmpg (last visited Apr. 29, 2014); 
Integrated Network of Care, PARK NICOLLET,  http://www.parknicollet.com/About (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2014). 
 143. Cf. ROBERT A. BERENSON & RACHEL A. BURTON, HEALTH AFF., HEALTH POLICY 
BRIEF: NEXT STEPS FOR ACOS 3 (Ted Agres et al. eds., 2012), available at 
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_61.pdf (explaining that 
ACOs performance on numerous metrics is essential to reduce spending and benefit from shared 
savings bonuses). 
 144. See Harvey & Cohen, supra note 138, at 141 (explaining that ACOs as a health system are 
exposed to institutional liability for medical malpractice). 
 145. See, e.g., Managed Healthcare Execs. State of the Industry 2013: Accountable Care 
Organizations, (Oct. 1, 2012), http://managedhealthcareexecutive.modernmedicine.com/managed-
healthcare-executive/news/state-industry-2013-accountable-care-organizations. 
 146. See Stephen M. Fatum & Robert M. Martin, Accountable Care Governance Issues, at 3-5, 
in ACOs, CO-OPs, and Other Options: A “How-To” Manual for Physicians Navigating a Post-
Reform World (Am. Med. Ass’n, 3d ed. 2012); DELOITTE CENTER FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, 
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: A NEW MODEL FOR SUSTAINABLE INNOVATION 15 
(2010). 
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enterprise should bear the financial risk of negligent medical errors, rather than the 
individual practitioners acting as a part of it.147  Physicians would likely continue to 
share in the costs of suit by, for example, reimbursing the ACO for what they 
otherwise would have owed as a premium to their liability insurer.148  Physicians 
would not, however, be named targets; rather, the ACO would take that place.149 
Placing the onus of liability on the ACO rather than on participating 
physicians would accomplish several important goals.  First, while juries may, as 
some have argued, be more likely to award larger damages against a faceless 
institution with a deeper pocket rather than against an individual physician,150 many 
ACOs, by virtue of their size alone, will have better resources than individual 
practitioners and most physician groups to investigate claims and negotiate with 
injured patients.151  As such, an ACO would be better situated to have, for example, 
a “disclosure and offer” program that proactively investigated adverse events and 
offer prospective compensation to negligently injured patients—a strategy that is 
financially and administratively out of the reach of most office-based physicians.152  
A prospective system such as this could offer compensation and necessary medical 
care as reparation to many injured patients who may never have brought a claim in 
the first place.153  In addition, all this would ideally take place in the context of 
 
 147. In the case of intentional or reckless harm, ACOs may seek a contractual clause allowing 
them to seek indemnity from the physician; however, allowing plaintiffs to name a practitioner 
individually where punitive damages might be sought might encourage excessive punitive damage 
claims, even if for no other reason than to encourage a fragmented and divisive defense. See Sage 
et al., supra note 41, at 26. 
 148. Id. at 17. 
 149. See, e.g., Kristie Tappan, Medical-Malpractice Reform: Is Enterprise Liability or No-
Fault a Better Reform?, 46 B. C. L. REV. 1095, 1105 (2005). 
 150. The sentiment is found as far back as 1852, when the court in Haring v. New-York and 
Erie Railroad Co. observed that “We can not shut our eyes to the fact that in certain controversies 
between the weak and the strong—between a humble individual and a gigantic corporation, the 
sympathies of the human mind naturally, honestly and generously, run to the assistance and 
support of the feeble, and apparently oppressed; and that compassion will sometimes exercise over 
the deliberations of a jury, an influence which, however honorable to them as philanthropists, is 
wholly inconsistent with the principles of law and the ends of justice.”  But see Neil Vidmar, 
Empirical Evidence on the ‘Deep Pockets’ Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in 
Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 255 (1993) (finding that juries are not inclined to 
award disproportionate amounts for pain and suffering when a defendant has a deep pocket). 
 151. See Frank A. Sloan & Mahmud Hassan, Equity and Accuracy in Medical Malpractice 
Insurance Pricing, 9 J. HEALTH ECON. 289, 313–17 (1990); see also SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra 
note 19, at 212 (noting that hospitals’ “size, resource, and status as continual defendants” would 
ultimately “create deterrence and provide incentive to implement systemwide safety measures”).  
 152. Cf. MICHELLE M. MELLO & ALLEN KACHALIA, MEDPAC, EVALUATION OF OPTIONS FOR 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM REFORM 36–39 (2010), available at 
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Apr10_MedicalMalpractice_CONTRACTOR.pdf (describing 
common elements of disclosure and offer programs, such as rapid investigations of errors and 
expedited decisions regarding appropriate compensation, and noting that presently such programs 
are only operated by a “handful of hospitals and liability insurers”). 
 153. See id. at 37 (noting that disclosure programs seek to remedy harm done to patients, even 
if the harm is not known to a patient or results in no medical-malpractice claim); see also Randall 
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quality improvement, with the ACO better able, after investigation, to take 
measures to help prevent such occurrences in the future.154  Transaction costs 
would be much lower and, if the experience of entities such as the University of 
Michigan Health System are any indication, having a disclosure and offer program 
may lower liability costs overall, even presuming that patients retained the right to 
sue if they were unsatisfied with the ACOs’ offer.155  To be sure, enterprise liability 
is not required in order to have such a system, but, by transferring liability to the 
ACO, it could help encourage its formation. 
ACOs would be aided in these pursuits by self-insuring or insuring via a 
captive insurance company, rather than by purchasing coverage on the market.156  
While self-insurance had once been more commonly used by larger health care 
entities, the use of captive insurers created by one or more business entities 
(parents) solely to insure the risk of that entity or entities has grown substantially in 
recent years.157  The parent pre-funds losses by paying premiums to the captive, 
which the IRS considers a tax-deductible business expense to the parent.158  Thus, 
rather than deducting losses as they are paid, which would be the case under a self-
insured model, the parent takes the deduction up-front.159  Excess premiums can be 
 
R. Bovbjerg & Robert Berenson, Enterprise Liability in the Twenty-First Century, in MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 231 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh, eds. 
2006). 
 154. See id. at 41 (arguing that the disclosure and offer approach will improve patient safety by 
promoting a culture of transparency and safety, facilitating error reporting, and allowing for “the 
open discussion of errors so that efforts to improve [patient safety] can be initiated”). 
 155. See Richard Boothman & Margot M. Hoyler, The University of Michigan’s Early 
Disclosure and Offer Program, THE BULLETIN OF THE AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS (Mar. 2, 2013), 
http://bulletin.facs.org/2013/03/michigans-early-disclosure/. 
 156. See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, The Potential of Captive Medical Liability Insurance 
Carriers and Damage Caps for Real Malpractice Reform, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 489, 498 (2012); 
C. Mitchell Goldman, Why Physician Groups Are Self-Insuring (2006), available at 
http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/goldmanmedpracmgmt0706.pdf.  
 157. See Richard M. Colombik, Captive Insurance Companies for Closely Led Businesses and 
Their Owners, 19 EXPERIENCE 42, 42 (2009); LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, CAPTIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 39.2 (3d ed., 1995); James A. Christopherson, 
The Captive Medical Malpractice Insurance Alternative, 5 ANN. HEALTH L. 121, 121–22 (1996); 
What Is Captive Insurance – Learn What Captive Insurance Is, CAPSTONE ASSOCIATED, 
http://www.capstoneassociated.com/what-is-a-captive.html (last visited May 29, 2014). “Rented” 
and agency captives are also options, but would not offer ACOs the same benefits concerning 
direction of investigation and insurance activities that captive ownership would. 
 158. See RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 157, at § 39.2. 
 159. See Moving from Self-Insurance to a Captive: How Much is the Potential Tax Benefit 
Worth?, MILLIMAN (Aug. 9, 1999), http://www.captive.com/service/milliman/article4_tax.shtml 
(explaining that under a self-insurance model, the parent company deducts losses as they are paid, 
but a captive insurance company may be able to “accelerate” the deductions).  This provides a 
modest financial benefit over taking the deduction on the back end; according to one Milliman 
estimate, a company would realize an estimated two percent to three percent in tax savings.  Id.  
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held in reserve and invested to fund future losses, or distributed to the parent as 
profit.160  
Insuring via a captive or via self-insurance permits a parent to direct the 
policies of the captive.161  This is particularly relevant for ACOs in the context of 
medical malpractice insurance.  If an ACO wanted to employ a disclosure and offer 
program, as discussed above, it could direct its captive to do so.  It could 
additionally coordinate research on medical errors and quality improvement 
programs.  Captives that do such things and more already exist; Harvard’s CRICO, 
for example, is one such entity.162 
3.  Enterprise Liability Versus Enterprise Insurance 
Given that many of the innovations discussed above do not require the 
institution of enterprise liability but instead can be done through our present 
liability regime, one might ask why one might prefer enterprise liability over, for 
example, enterprise insurance, where an ACO would simply provide malpractice 
coverage to its participating physicians through a captive,163 self-insurance, or 
otherwise.  Enterprise insurance is widely used by academic medical centers to 
cover their faculty.164  It has been less common elsewhere in the health care 
industry, but that may be in part because physician employment has not been as 
common outside of academic medicine until more recently.165  As consolidation 
continues in the health care sector, it is likely that enterprise insurance will also 
become more common. Not only does enterprise insurance offer improved financial 
benefits to larger health care entities with an employed physician staff, but it also 
allows for better risk- and quality-management.166   
Some have observed that, if enterprise insurance were such an attractive 
option, it ought to be more widespread now than it is.167  Among other issues, 
 
 160. Retaining profit that otherwise would have accrued to the unassociated insurer is, of 
course, one of the primary general reasons for insuring via a captive rather than through a 
traditional insurer.  See Colombik, supra note 157, at 42. 
 161. See Philip England et al., Captive Insurance Companies: A Growing Alternative Method 
of Risk Financing, J. PAYMENT SYSS. L. 701, 702 (2007), available at 
http://www.andersonkill.com/webpdfext/cic-riskfinancing.pdf. 
 162. Protecting Providers. Promoting Safety., CRICO, https://www.rmf.harvard.edu/About-
CRICO (last accessed Sept. 28, 2013), 
 163. See MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 268 (William M. 
Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006). 
 164. See, e.g., SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 19, at 316. 
 165. Merritt Hawkins’ most recent survey of physician recruitment found that, in 2011–2012, 
sixty-three percent of the firm’s search assignments were for hospital employment, up from only 
eleven percent in 2003–2004. MERRITT HAWKINS, 2012 REVIEW OF PHYSICIAN RECRUITING 
INCENTIVES, 4 (2012), available at http://www.merritthawkins.com/uploadedFiles/ 
MerrittHawkins/Pdf/mha2012survpreview.pdf.  
 166. See SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 19, at 316, 318. 
 167. Id. at 319. 
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enterprise insurance presently makes sense only where physicians are either 
employed or participate in a closed staff model, so that the enterprise providing the 
malpractice insurance is also responsible—legally, financially, or otherwise—for 
all the patients that the covered physicians see.168  While this would not be the case 
in an ACO, the strong distinction between “internal” and “external” patients will be 
diminished.  Because an ACO will not know in advance which of its patients will 
be counted toward the ACO’s performance and which will not, the ACO has an 
incentive to encourage its participating providers to meet cost and quality metrics 
for all the patients they see, and not just the “ACO” patients.169  
Yet an ACO’s control over both risk and quality could improve further 
through assumption of enterprise liability, rather than enterprise insurance.170  As 
the ACO would bear the burden of litigation, it would possess not merely 
institutional authority, but also moral authority for deterring errors and enforcing 
quality measures.171  This would be particularly important, given that most ACO 
participants will not provide services exclusively to ACO patients, but also to 
others, both within and outside the context of the ACO.172  If an ACO provided 
only enterprise insurance, it would possess fewer means by which to enforce 
quality standards for care provided outside the ACO.173  Financial means would 
 
 168. Cf. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 19, at 319 (noting that one of the reasons enterprise 
insurance is not more common is because most physicians are independent and not employed by a 
hospital). 
 169. Cf. 42 C.F.R. § 425.400(a)(2)(iii) (“Final assignment [of beneficiaries] is determined after 
the end of each performance year, based on data from the performance year.”); see also HOOPER, 
LUNDY, & BOOKMAN, P.C., ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATION FINAL REGULATION: 
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 9 (Oppenheim et al., eds. 2011), available at http://health-
law.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/HLB_ACO_White_Paper_-_Final_Rule.pdf (“A principal 
reason given by CMS for retaining retrospective beneficiary assignment is its desire for ACO 
networks to apply the same efficient and effective approaches to delivering heath care to all 
Medicare beneficiaries, regardless of whether they are ultimately assigned to the ACO. The notion 
is that if the ACO is not sure whether a beneficiary its providers are treating will be assigned to 
the ACO, the ACO’s providers will treat all of the beneficiaries under the assumption that they 
will ultimately be assigned to the ACO, and as a consequence, the Medicare program and all of its 
beneficiaries will share in whatever benefits are derived from the SSP [shared savings 
program].”). 
 170. See SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 19, at 211, 319 (explaining that “enterprise liability 
potentially allows integration of patient safety activities with medical malpractice insurance, 
implementing systems-based loss control mechanisms and quality assurance programs,” whereas 
enterprise insurance, in allowing physician autonomy, “conflicts with the goal of improving 
patient safety”). 
 171. Cf. Bovbjerg & Berenson, supra note 153, at 237 (noting in the context of systems safety 
that “[w]hat is blameworthy is not the normal human propensity to slips and lapses but the refusal 
to cooperate with systematic efforts at improvement, which requires disclosure and learning from 
problems.”); see also Mission, Vision and Values, MICHIGAN PIONEER ACO (2013), 
http://www.michiganpioneeraco.com/?id=14&sid=1 (indicating that ACOs have an ethical and 
moral obligation to providing patients with the highest care). 
 172. See supra note 169 and associated text. 
 173. Cf. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 19, at 315 (describing one of the objections to 
enterprise insurance as lack of control by hospitals over independent physicians). 
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still exist: in the shared savings program, the structure provides that ACOs will not 
prospectively know which of its Medicare patients will be counted in determining 
costs and quality for shared savings.174  An ACO could also use risk rating in re-
credentialing providers.175  Yet the degree of coordination that CMS envisioned 
may require more impetus for success, particularly in convincing physicians to 
reduce their use of unnecessary tests, medications, and procedures, and in 
prompting them to work more closely with other providers in the care of individual 
patients.176 Enterprise liability would take risk off of physicians in adhering to new 
standards, while providing ACOs with added leverage in enforcing quality and 
practice strictures.  
One might think physicians would eagerly accept a shift in liability from 
themselves to another entity.177  Yet this issue may pose the largest hurdle, at least 
politically, in a switch to exclusive enterprise liability.178  In 1993, the Task Force 
on National Health Reform proposed exclusive enterprise liability as part of the 
Clinton Health Security Act,179 with managed care plans as the relevant enterprise.  
However, physicians vociferously rejected it.180  According to William Sage and 
Robert Berenson, among others, the primary problem was physicians’ fear of loss 
of professional autonomy.181  This should not come as a surprise. Here, physicians 
regard the threat of liability not so much as something to be feared, but rather as 
leverage to help retain the ability to practice as they see fit.  They can cite fear of 
litigation, should they miss a malignancy, as justification not to follow the 
recommendations of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force on breast cancer 
 
 174. See supra note 169 and associated text. 
 175. Cf. DELOITTE, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: A NEW MODEL FOR 
SUSTAINABLE INNOVATION 16 (2010), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/dcom-
unitedstates/local%20assets/documents/us_Chs_accountableCareorganizations_041910.pdf 
(discussing risk-management infrastructure). 
 176. See, e.g., Peter B. Bach, The Trouble with “Doctor Knows Best,” N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 
2012, at D5. 
 177. See, e.g., Bovbjerg & Berenson, supra note 153, at 229. 
 178. See, e.g., CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS 
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 171–72 (1995) (noting that in response to the Clinton 
administration’s proposal for health plan enterprise liability, the American Medical Association 
(AMA) and over a hundred medical groups sent a letter opposing the plan). 
 179. See Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong. § 5311 (1st Sess. 1993). 
 180. See Bovbjerg & Berenson, supra note 153, at 230 (reporting that, in response to 
Berenson’s advocacy of enterprise liability during consideration of the Health Security Act, a 
physician reportedly said, “I have a constitutional right to be sued, and you can’t take it away from 
me.”). 
 181. See Sage, supra note 12, at 170. (noting that organized medicine feared the most that with 
enactment of enterprise liability, health plans would “micromanage clinical practice”); see also 
Bovbjerg & Berenson, supra note 153, at 230 (explaining that the most important reason for 
physicians to oppose to the enterprise liability is the loss of professional autonomy, which they 
also fought against in managed care). 
	   	  
2014] ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN ACOS 301 
screening or PSA testing.182  A similar citation can justify the ordering of a 
screening exercise electrocardiogram on a middle aged, “worried well,” patient, 
despite the lack of indicating risk factors, even though available evidence clearly 
suggests the test is unnecessary and ought not to be done.183  While the fear of suit 
may remain a constant and unwelcome presence when liability reposes on 
physicians, that fear can always also be cited as a justification for broad autonomy 
in their practice.  The ACA’s movements toward determining best practices, and 
regularizing and coordinating care, while certainly welcome by some practitioners, 
are in conflict with this ethos.184 
Additional factors might work against such a change.  Enterprise liability 
would not eliminate all suit-driven ills for physicians.  On the positive side of the 
ledger, they would neither face individual liability, nor the rare but extant 
possibility of financial ruin.185  Additionally, the institution may act as a beneficial 
buffer between practitioners and patients in the context of malpractice, making the 
issue less personal.  Yet physicians would still need to expend substantial amounts 
of time in connection with a lawsuit.186  The shame factor would also likely still 
exist in lesser form.187  Reduced control over conduct of suit and settlement could 
also become an issue, with a physician’s reputation possibly in the balance.188 
 
 182. See Craig E. Pollack et al., Primary Care Providers’ Response to the US Preventive 
Services Task Force Draft Recommendations on Screening for Prostate Cancer, 172 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 668, 669 (2012) (observing that despite the advice from the U.S. Preventive 
Services Task Force (USPSTF) against routine prostate-specific antigen (PSA) screening for 
prostate cancer, one of the barriers to adopting that recommendation is fear of malpractice 
litigation). 
 183. See When to Say ‘Whoa!’ to Your Doctor, CONSUMER REPS. 12, 13 (June 2012), 
http://consumerhealthchoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ChoosingWiselyWhoaPkg.pdf 
(discussing that doctors sometimes order medical procedures, such as a routine EKG exam, for 
patients who do not have symptoms of heart disease or are not at high risk of it, and it is pointed 
out that one of the reasons of these unnecessary tests is to protect themselves from lawsuits). 
 184. See supra notes 139–143 and associated text. 
 185. See supra section II.B.1. 
 186. See Armand Leone, Jr., ADR and Enterprise Liability, BRITCHER, LEONE & ROTH, 
reprinted in N. J. L. J., Nov 8, 1993, http://www.medmalnj.com/Legal-Articles-by-Armand-Leone-
Jr/ADR-and-Enterprise-Liability.shtml (last visited October 3, 2013) (explaining that even if an 
institution, such as a health maintenance organization (HMO), would substitute for individual 
doctors in a malpractice suit, they would still participate in litigations as fact witnesses). 
 187. See, e.g., Maxwell Mehlman, The Shame of Medical Malpractice, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 17, 
26–27 (2006) (noting the feelings of shame that physicians report when patients sue); but see 
Philip G. Peters Jr., Resuscitating Hospital Enterprise Liability, 73 MO. L. REV. 369, 388–89 
(arguing that because physicians consider being personally sued for malpractice as a form of 
punishment, an enterprise liability system would ease this concern as it would eliminate the formal 
claim against individual physicians and would not require reporting of malpractice to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank). 
 188. See Bovbjerg & Berenson, supra note 153, at 230 (stating that another reason that 
physicians resist enterprise liability is a concern that a third party may settle a case of physician 
liability and potentially impair their reputations). 
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These hurdles may make enterprise insurance a more attractive, intermediary 
option.189  ACOs could insure participating health care providers for all the care 
that the latter provides in exchange for a risk-adjusted premium.  While the 
preliminary safety and quality data an ACO would have to work with may be 
limited, it could—and should—easily collect more detailed information over time 
that it could use to adjust the premium upward or downward, as well as provide 
practical feedback on quality performance to providers, at least within the context 
of the ACO.190  Data from non-ACO patients would not automatically be available 
to the ACO, but an ACO could require its submission if it wished to use it, or at 
least a sampling of it, to compare against ACO data.191  The use of risk-adjustment 
would encourage providers with better safety and litigation records to participate in 
the ACO, while acting as a disincentive to others.192  With time, a move to 
enterprise liability could be considered, if it would help to better align provider 
interests with measures to improve quality of care and reduce less effective or 
unnecessary care. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
With the continued movement toward prioritizing the integration and 
coordination of health care and the use of evidence-based clinical practice 
guidelines to support improved health care outcomes, enterprise liability should 
once again be given serious consideration.  If done well, it has greater potential 
than enterprise insurance to enhance patient safety and quality of care, while at the 
same time facilitating compensation for negligently injured patients.  As we 
implement the ACA, the time may be ripe to give enterprise liability a new try. 
 
 
 189. I am grateful to William Sage for this observation. 
 190. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., SUMMARY OF FINAL RULE PROVISIONS FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 
UNDER THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/ACO_Summary_Factsheet_ICN907404.pdf (noting 
that the final rule for ACOs requires them to give timely feedback regarding quality measures to 
providers for improved quality performance). 
 191. See AM. ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, AN ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE ON ACCOUNTABLE 
CARE ORGANIZATIONS 9 (2012), available at 
http://www.actuary.org/files/ACO_IB_UPDATE_Final_121912.pdf (discussing that for 
successful care, an ACO needs to collect the data from various sources, including non-ACO 
providers, because some patients would still receive medical care outside the ACO network).  
 192. See, e.g., Catherine I. Hanson, Risk Adjustment, in EVALUATING AND NEGOTIATING 
EMERGING PAYMENT OPTIONS 3 (Am. Med. Ass’n. ed., 3d ed., 2012), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/psa/payment-options.pdf#page=109 (pointing out that 
without adequate risk adjustment, physicians providing quality of care would be disadvantaged 
because they attract patients with serious illness, but have to practice under the same budgets with 
peer physicians who do not treat similar patients). 
